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Immigration, Citizenship and Consent:  
What is Wrong with Permanent Alienage? 
 
 A migrant’s path to citizenship involves two important steps. The first is 
immigration; the second naturalization. Each step corresponds to an important ethical 
question. Must foreigners be allowed to immigrate? Must immigrants be offered 
citizenship? Liberal democratic states offer a different answer to each of these 
questions. While they continue to jealously guard their power to restrict immigration, 
they have come to recognise a norm of granting citizenship to legally resident 
immigrants after a period of residency, usually five to ten years. The borders can be 
closed, but citizenship must be accessible. Philosophers too tend to separate the two 
questions. Those defending immigration restrictions acknowledge a duty to 
naturalise.1 Even Joseph Carens, the most prominent advocate of open borders, treats 
the two questions as distinct. He makes his argument for naturalization while 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that immigration restrictions are permissible.2  
 There is then disagreement as to whether foreigners must be admitted but 
broad agreement that those foreigners who are admitted must, at some point, be 
offered citizenship. There is, moreover, a consensus that the immigration question and 
                                                 
 Various drafts of this article have been presented to audiences at EUI, Helsinki, Ottawa and Oxford, 
receiving extremely helpful feedback on each occasion. I would like to thank the organisers of these 
events, Rainer Bauböck, Timo Airaksinen, Andrew I. Cohen, Patti Leonard, Christine Straehle and 
Matthew Gibney, as well as Marc Hanvelt who acted as respondent in Ottawa. Early comments by 
Joseph Carens proved pivotal, as did assistance from Leila Sinclair-Bright, Sarah Fine and Helder De 
Schutter on later drafts. Finally, I owe thanks to the editor and reviewers for the Journal of Political 
Philosophy for their excellent comments and suggestions. 
1 David Miller, 'Immigrants, Nations and Citizenship', Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008), 371-
390, Christopher H. Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association', Ethics 119 (2008), 109-141, 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 
1983), Chapter 2. 
2 Joseph H. Carens, 'Citizenship and Civil Society: The Rights of Residents', in Dual Nationality, 
Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in Europe and the US: The Reinvention of Citizenship, ed. 
Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil, (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2002) at p. 101. 
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the naturalisation question can be decoupled: a right to citizenship does not 
presuppose a right to immigrate. 
 This article critiques that consensus view. It argues that if it really were the 
case that states had moral discretion to restrict immigration, then states would also be 
entitled to permanently exclude voluntary migrants from citizenship. Voluntary 
migrants are those who are not forced to migrate. Unlike refugees or desperately poor 
economic migrants, they could lead a reasonably decent life back home. Since they 
migrate voluntarily, their choice to do so could be taken to signal consent to the terms 
of their admission were there no right to immigrate. It is only because the idea of a 
right to immigrate is plausible that we have reason to think that permanent alienage is 
wrong, even in the case of voluntary migrants. 
 Section 1 offers a working definition of citizenship. Sections 2 to 4 consider 
three arguments for naturalization: from social ties, relational equality and fairness to 
citizens. If these arguments were successful, they could ground a right to citizenship 
without recourse to the idea of a right to immigrate. However, as I shall show, all 
three arguments fail. Section 5 presents an alternative argument, which holds that 
long-term resident aliens should not be treated differently to native residents unless 
there is a relevant difference separating the two. Section 6 and 7 show how this equal 
treatment argument is threatened by an objection from consent, at least in the case of 
voluntary migrants. Section 8 and 9 explains how the idea of a human right to 
immigrate offers a response to the consent objection.  
 
1. What is Citizenship? 
 Citizenship is formal membership of a state. Within the context of the debates 
over naturalization, it has, at core, two elements. First, the title, “citizen”. As with 
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“marriage”, the title matters. A lesser title, such as “subject” or “permanent resident”, 
suggests a lesser status and is therefore not citizenship, even if all else remains the 
same. Second, citizenship entitles people to a bundle of rights. Which rights are in the 
bundle is not crucial to the definition of citizenship. There are rights that we expect to 
be there. One is the right to vote. Another is the right to hold a passport. But there are 
also rights that are part of the bundle in one country and absent in another. For 
instance, citizenship may entitle members to state health care in one country but not in 
another. What is more important than the identity of the rights within the bundle is the 
fact that there is a bundle, it is granted to all people called “citizens” and it is the same 
bundle for all.  
 There are a number of things which citizenship is not. First amongst them is a 
“right to have rights”. Carens is correct to insist upon this.3 The most important rights 
people possess are arguably those that under international law everyone possesses. 
These are basic human rights to security, subsistence, liberty of religion, association, 
expression and so forth. To insist that long-term foreign residents be awarded 
citizenship is not then to insist that their basic rights be respected.  
 Nor does citizenship guarantee anyone greater income, wealth, health or 
happiness. A permanent alien could be a multi-millionaire living in luxury. There may 
be a contingent relationship between alienage and disadvantage, but we only have 
reason to predict this when there is a significant difference between the rights that 
citizens and foreign residents enjoy. There need be no such difference. Indeed, the 
trend in western liberal democracies is towards greater parity between citizens and 
                                                 
3 The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 93-94. The phrase “right to have 
rights” is Hannah Arendt’s. However, as Carens notes, Arendt uses the phrase to describe the situation 
in Europe during the interwar years, not as a definition of citizenship. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins 
of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1973), chapter nine. 
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residents.4 Whatever one thinks of this trend, there is no conceptual incoherence in the 
idea of awarding residents almost all the rights of citizenship.  
 Having better understood citizenship, we have a better understanding of what 
the insistence that long-term residents be awarded citizenship involves. It is not an 
insistence that long-term foreign residents have their basic human rights respected, be 
emancipated from some quasi-slave status or enjoy some basic level of wellbeing. 
Indeed, it is not an insistence that they be granted any particular right in the 
citizenship bundle. Rather, it is the demand that long-term residents be awarded the 
title of “citizen” and whatever rights go along with that title.  
 With this much clear, we can already discount one argument for naturalisation: 
the argument that all long-term residents have a right to democratic inclusion in the 
country in which they reside. Perhaps democracy is incomplete if residents are 
disenfranchised.5 Nevertheless, this argument fails as an argument for naturalization. 
Many countries allow foreign residents to vote in some or all elections.6 The right to 
vote is one right in the citizenship bundle; it is not citizenship itself.7 
 
2. Social Ties 
 A more promising argument, offered by Joseph Carens and Ayelet Shachar, 
holds that immigrants establish a right to citizenship on the basis of the social ties 
linking them to the host country.8 When immigrants move to a country they are likely 
to establish ties through work, education, civic associations and friendship groups. 
                                                 
4 Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 163-175. 
5 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 56-61, Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, p. 50. 
6 Rainer Bauböck, 'Expansive Citizenship: Voting beyond Territory and Membership', PS: Political 
Science & Politics 38 (2005), 683-687. 
7 Jonathan Seglow, 'Arguments for Naturalisation', Political Studies 57 (2009), 788-804 at p. 793. 
8 Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, especially Chapters 2 and 3; Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright 
Lottery (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), Chapter 6. 
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These ties will likely strengthen as time progresses. At some point, an immigrant has 
acquired such strong social ties that they have become a member of the political 
community and deserve recognition as such. To be formally recognised as a member 
is to be granted citizenship. 
 This argument involves the following principle: 
P. Citizenship should be open to everyone who has established social ties within a 
political community. 
 The problem with this argument is that it cannot support our considered 
judgements as to who is and who is not entitled to citizenship. P is both over- and 
under- inclusive. It is over-inclusive because social ties do not stop neatly at 
international borders. Some people will have established strong social ties in a foreign 
country without living there. Suppose an English person holidays in the same Italian 
village each year. He learns Italian and makes friends. Over the years, he gets to know 
everyone in the village and becomes part of village life. Is he owed Italian 
citizenship? Most people would say ‘no’. But why not if social ties are the basis for 
citizenship?  
 It might be suggested that, as a tourist, the social ties that the English person 
has established are insufficient. But a long-term foreign resident may have established 
even weaker social ties. This is how P is under-inclusive. There are residents who do 
not speak the national language, have failed to make friends and are not part of the 
community. Perhaps they never leave their home. The social ties argument cannot 
explain what is wrong with permanent alienage in such cases. 
 One response might be to argue that residency is the best proxy we have for 
social ties. On this view, at the level of principle, we want to offer citizenship to all 
and only those with strong social ties but, at the level of practice, we only offer 
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citizenship to long-term residents since it is too difficult to identify socially isolated 
residents and socially engaged non-residents. But this suggestion is unconvincing in 
both its normative and empirical claims. Normatively, socially isolated residents seem 
entitled to citizenship; socially engaged non-residents do not. Empirically, it does not 
seem so hard to identify those with weaker or stronger social ties. For instance, 
applicants for citizenship could be asked for letters of reference from friends, 
employers, schools etc. to verify that the applicant is socially engaged. Any such 
system would not be perfect, but it would be a more accurate way to determine social 
ties than using residency as a proxy. 
 A second response, at least to the problem of under-inclusion, would be to 
argue that many of those foreign residents who are socially isolated would prefer not 
to be. Social isolation is foisted upon them whether by patriarchal repression (they are 
women forced to stay home) or mental illness. It would be pernicious to exclude the 
victims of unwanted social isolation from citizenship. This move would involve 
replacing P with something like the following principle: 
P2. Citizenship should be open to everyone who has established social ties within a 
country or would have done so had they not suffered unwanted social isolation. 
 But P2 is also both over- and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because 
there will be many people living abroad who would have immigrated and established 
social ties had they not suffered unwanted social isolation. Consider, for instance, 
women living in traditional societies who would like to immigrate (to join family 
members, perhaps) but cannot do so because repressive husbands keep them home. 
P2, like P, thus demands that citizenship be awarded to non-resident foreigners. This 
seems counter intuitive. P2 is under-inclusive because there will be at least some 
long-term foreign residents who desire social isolation.  
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 A final response involves biting the bullet. All and only those who have 
established the requisite social ties should be awarded citizenship. Gregarious tourists 
must be awarded citizenship; socially isolated residents can be permissibly denied it. 
This response, while consistent, is unlikely to attract many adherents. It is out of step 
both with current practice and with the views of philosophers writing on the issue. 
Moreover, this response accepts the permissibility of permanent alienage in the case 
of the socially isolated. It is not then a response that could be given by the scholars 
this article critiques: those who condemn permanent alienage while defending 
immigration restrictions.  
 When Carens defends the social ties argument he relies upon none of these 
responses. He argues at the level of principle, not just at the level of practice, against 
leaving the socially isolated in a state of permanent alienage. Nor does he restrict the 
scope of his concern only to those who suffer unwanted isolation. For Carens, long-
term residents should be awarded citizenship even if they have chosen to spur social 
connections.9 Carens might well be right to make this claim, but in making it he is, 
quite simply, abandoning his social ties argument. If long-term residents are entitled 
to citizenship, whether or not they have established social ties, then it is not social ties 
that grounds entitlement to citizenship. 
 Settlement, it seems, is crucial to the distribution of citizenship. Carens 
implicitly acknowledges this, but he should have done so explicitly, replacing P and 
P2 with something like: 
P3. Citizenship should be open to everyone who has settled within a state’s territory 
for a certain number of years. 
                                                 
9 Carens argues that social isolation “wanted or unwanted” should not be used as “criterion justifying 
exclusion from citizenship”. Carens, 'Citizenship and Civil Society', p112. 
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 This principle will cover socially isolated residents but exclude gregarious 
tourists and other socially engaged non-residents. The principle thus supports our 
considered judgements regarding actual cases.  
 Of course, acknowledging the principle is not the same as justifying it. A 
puzzle still remains as to why mere settlement should be awarded such importance. I 
cannot hope to resolve this puzzle here and in what follows, I will simply assume that 
that settlement is a morally relevant factor such that it is morally permissible to refuse 
foreigners citizenship if they have not settled within a country. What I shall focus on 
instead is explaining why foreigners who have settled are entitled to citizenship. I 
shall focus, in other words, on explaining what is wrong with permanent alienage. I 
present my own argument in section 5. First, however, let us consider two further 
arguments from the literature. 
 
3. Relational Equality 
 For Christopher Wellman, naturalization is necessary for the realisation of 
“relational equality”. Wellman draws on the work of Elizabeth Anderson to argue that 
equality, properly considered, is a matter of achieving the right kind of human 
relationships: relationships governed by mutual respect rather than any form of 
oppression.10 To have such relationships, one need not enjoy equal amounts of 
income, wealth, health or happiness. Relational equality is not distributive equality.11 
Nevertheless, relational equality does make demands on resources. Oppression occurs 
when people are placed in vulnerable situations. Thus, to be secured against 
oppression, everyone must be guaranteed certain capabilities, including education, 
                                                 
10 Elizabeth Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality?', Ethics 109 (1999), 287-337, Wellman, 
'Immigration and Freedom of Association', pp. 121-126. 
11 Elizabeth Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality?', pp. 317, 320, 335 
 9 
healthcare and decent working conditions.12 Wellman argues that permanent alienage 
leaves residents open to oppression. To secure them against oppression, they must be 
awarded citizenship.13  
 Whether or not Wellman is right that relational equality demands equal 
citizenship depends on how we define egalitarian as opposed to oppressive 
relationships. It will not do to simply define egalitarian relationships as involving 
equal citizenship rights. If the argument is to be more than stipulative, we need some 
independent idea of what constitutes oppressive/equal relationships. It is important 
then that Anderson and Wellman do provide examples of oppressive relationships and 
that Anderson lists the capabilities people must have to live as equals. This lends us 
some criteria to judge whether permanent alienage and relational equality really are 
incompatible. 
 Anderson’s primary examples of oppression are relationships governed by 
racist, sexist and other prejudicial norms. In these relationships, Anderson argues, 
people are demeaned, exploited, marginalised, dominated or subjected to violence.14 
They cannot pursue their claims without having to “bow and scrape before others”.15 
Wellman argues that immigration policies too can be oppressive. His primary 
example is the European guest worker programmes, as depicted in Michael Walzer’s 
Sphere of Justice.16 According to Walzer, guest workers on these programmes were 
subject to low pay, social exclusion, fear and racism.17  
  If migrants are to escape oppression of this kind, then they are certainly 
entitled to a set of basic rights. But it is far from clear that they must be awarded 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 317-324. 
13 Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association', pp. 125-126, 133-134. 
14 Elizabeth Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality?', p. 313 
15 Ibid. 
16 Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association', pp. 133-134. 
17 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 56-61. 
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citizenship. The capabilities Anderson lists are quite specific, designed to ensure that 
people do not sink below a basic threshold.18 They include education, healthcare, and 
decent working conditions. They do not include all and every right that a society may 
wish to include in the citizenship bundle. 
 Consider, for example, the right to hold a passport of the host country. This 
right, so closely associated with citizenship, is distinct from both a right to a passport 
of any kind and a right to permanently remain in the host country. A migrant already 
has a passport (the passport of her home country) and she can receive the right to 
permanently remain without being awarded a new passport. A permanent residency 
visa suffices. A new passport might be useful, but it is inessential. One is not 
oppressed by others simply because one does not hold the same passport as them. 
 Further evidence that permanent alienage could be compatible with relational 
equality comes from an assessment of the case of privileged migrants, such as 
bankers, engineers and professors. Unlike European guest workers, these people do 
not seem to suffer from oppression, nor struggle to be recognised as equals. It seems 
unlikely that this is due merely to the promise of citizenship. Rather, the rights and 
privileges they currently enjoy, in the absence of citizenship, seem sufficient to secure 
them against oppression.  
 Is there really no argument to be made from relational equality against 
permanent alienage? I have so far followed Anderson and Wellman in characterising 
relational equality as opposed to certain harsh forms of treatment. But perhaps 
relational equality is more demanding that this. Arguably, people do not relate to one 
another in the full spirit of equality if they subject one another to arbitrary forms of 
discrimination, however mild. To live as equals, people must commit to the principle 
                                                 
18 Elizabeth Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality?', p. 320. 
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that all should be treated alike, absent a justification for differential treatment.19 Were 
we to regard the distinction between citizens and residents as an arbitrary form of 
discrimination, we would seem to have the basis for an argument against permanent 
alienage. This, indeed, is precisely the kind of argument I wish to develop below.20  
 
4. Unfairness to Citizens 
 Helder De Schutter and Lea Ypi present what is perhaps the most novel 
argument for naturalization. Permanent alienage, they argue, is unfair to citizens. The 
existing literature errs when it emphasises the benefits of citizenship and ignores the 
burdens. Their examples of burdens include conscription, jury service, voting and a 
sense of shame for national wrongs. Citizens must bear these burdens; foreigners need 
not. Permanent alienage is thus unfair to citizens, allowing resident foreigners to reap 
the benefits of projects (national defence, criminal justice, democratic politics etc.) 
that citizens are required to support.21  
 De Schutter and Ypi are certainly right that citizenship involves burdens as 
well as benefits. They are too quick, however, in assuming that the existence of 
burdens renders permanent alienage unfair to citizens. What matters, from the point of 
view of fairness, is not burdens but net burdens. Permanent alienage would only be 
                                                 
19 For a conception of relational equality of this sort see Christian Schemmel, 'Why Relational 
Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions', Social Theory and Practice 37 (2011), 365-390 at pp. 
370-375. 
20 This section has questioned the link between relational equality and citizenship. Let me add here that 
there is a second problem with Wellman’s argument: the assumption that immigration restrictions do 
not violate relational equality. While Wellman is particularly concerned with relationships within 
countries, he accepts that relational egalitarians should also be concerned with the relationships across 
borders ('Immigration and Freedom of Association', p. 124). Yet if we were to accept Wellman’s claim 
that permanent aliens, no matter how privileged, are necessarily denied relational equality, it would 
seem strange to think that excluded migrants enjoy relational equality, given the coercion they are 
subject to. This combination of views becomes even more difficult to sustain once we recognize the 
strength of the reasons people have to migrate (see section 10). Placing razor wire and armed guards in 
the way of peaceful people, preventing them from leading their lives as they please, seems, intuitively, 
like a better example of oppression that the mere denial of non-basic citizenship rights. 
21 Helder De Schutter and Lea Ypi, 'Mandatory Citizenship for Immigrants', British Journal of Political 
Science 45 (2015), 235-251.  
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unfair to citizens if the burdens of citizenship outweighed the benefits. There are two 
reasons to think this is not so. 
 First, the burdens De Schutter and Ypi cite are not particularly burdensome. 
Few citizens are called for jury service and those that are can appeal to be excused. 
Trials tend to be short (4-5 days is the US average) and jurors receive financial 
compensation.22 While voting can take time away from other valuable activities, it 
seems strange to regard the right to vote as a net burden. The fact that millions of 
people have campaigned for their own enfranchisement, while few, if any, have 
requested disenfranchisement, suggests that the right to vote is, on balance, 
desirable.23 Conscription is a severe burden, but in an age of professional militaries, it 
is increasingly rare. There are, moreover, strong arguments against conscription.24 If it 
is wrong, it should not be extended but discontinued. If citizens sometimes suffer 
shame for national wrongdoing, there is an important flipside: the pride felt for 
national achievements. Permanent aliens may escape feelings of national shame, but 
they are equally unable to share in national pride.  
 Second, it is citizens, not foreigners, who determine immigration policy. It 
seems unlikely that citizens would vote for policies that impose unfair net burdens 
upon themselves. It is much more likely that they will remain mindful of their own 
interests and ensure that the benefits of citizenship outweigh the costs. Moreover, 
even if it were the case that foreigners were currently free riding, citizens could make 
corrections without extending citizenship to all. Corrections could be made in one of 
                                                 
22 The Bureau of International Information Programs of the US Department of State, 'Anatomy of a 
Jury Trial', eJournal USA 14 (2009), 4-42, available from http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov (accessed 
July 11 2015). 
23 In most countries, moreover, voting is voluntary. Those who resent voting are free not to vote. De 
Schutter and Ypi claim that citizens are subject to strong social pressures to vote ('Mandatory 
Citizenship', p. 241), but low voting rates in many democracies suggest otherwise. 
24 A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 43-64. 
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two ways: foreigners could be asked to share the costs or, alternatively, citizens could 
be compensated with additional benefits. 
 In short, it seems unlikely that a policy of denying citizenship to long-term 
residents will unfairly burden citizens and, even if it did, such unfairness could be 
corrected without abandoning the policy. As common sense would suggest, whatever 
is wrong with permanent alienage, it is a wrong suffered by migrants not citizens. 
 
5. Equal treatment 
 Let us turn finally to an argument that, I think, can help to explain what is 
wrong with permanent alienage although, as we shall see, it requires an extensive 
defence. The argument holds that natives and foreigners should not be treated 
differently unless there is a relevant moral difference that can justify differential 
treatment. This is an important principle invoked not only in the literature on 
immigration but also in debates on global distributive justice. The principle is entailed 
by the more general principle of formal equality: like cases should be treated alike.  
 The native-born children of citizens who are raised and reside within their 
parents’ country should be awarded citizenship of that country. If any claim is 
uncontroversial, this is.25 Moreover, native-born children should retain their 
citizenship even if they are outcasts from society, do not share the majority identity or 
choose to live in social isolation. Their right to citizenship is unqualified in this 
respect. Note, also, that most people fit this category of person: they are born, raised 
and reside in their parent’s country of citizenship. This is the standard case. As such, 
it is a good model when thinking about naturalization. 
                                                 
25 Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, p. 22. 
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 What is the difference then between this standard case and that of immigrants? 
In the case of tourists, students and other short-term visitors, lack of settlement seems 
to be a relevant factor. That was our conclusion from section 3. But what about long-
term residents? What morally relevant difference is there between foreign long-term 
residents and native residents? They are both settled within the state on an on-going 
basis. Both are subject to its laws. Either one could be socially engaged or socially 
isolated. If there is no relevant difference between the two, long-term foreign 
residents and natives should be treated alike; the former enjoying the same citizenship 
status as the latter. 
 This is the equal treatment argument. To defeat the argument, one must find a 
relevant difference separating foreign long-term residents from natives. As we have 
intimated, this is not easy. What is contingently true of some portion of the native 
population is unlikely to be true of them all, let alone be morally relevant to the 
distribution of citizenship. There is, however, something that is necessarily true of all 
native-born residents that points us in the direction of what might be a morally 
relevant factor: the fact that natives did not choose to enter their country but were 
born and raised there. Since they did not choose to enter, they cannot be said to have 
consented to their status. By contrast, many foreign-born residents did choose to enter 
the country voluntarily. If they had no right to enter the country then, arguably, they 
can be said to have consented to their status by choosing to migrate. Consent then 
may represent a relevant moral difference between some foreign-born long-term 
residents and natives and a defence of permanent alienage.  
 
6. The Consent Argument for Permanent Alienage  
 15 
 Immigrants can be roughly separated into two camps: voluntary and 
involuntary migrants. Voluntary migrants have a reasonable alternative to migrating; 
involuntary migrants do not. Since most people in rich countries have a reasonable 
standard of living, most adults from rich countries who migrate, migrate voluntarily. 
Children, refugees and desperately poor economic migrants have no reasonable 
alternative.  
 There is, of course, no clean line separating voluntary from involuntary 
migrants. As with most distinctions, there are areas of grey and in some cases it would 
be difficult to determine which camp a migrant belongs to. But there are cases in 
which the right clarification is readily apparent. Governments, which already make 
determinations of age, wealth and refugee status when processing asylum and benefits 
claims, would be able to identify a group of people who are clearly voluntary 
migrants.  
 The distinction between voluntary and involuntary migrants matters because 
involuntary migrants cannot be said to have consented to the terms of their admission. 
They had no genuine choice. Voluntary migrants, however, can be regarded as 
signalling consent, if, that is, we assume the traditional view that people have no right 
to immigrate. If people have no right to immigrate and states are permitted to admit or 
exclude whom they wish, why should states not also decide the terms of admission for 
voluntary migrants? 
 We can call this the “consent model for just terms of admission”. It works as 
follows. A state voluntarily chooses to admit a certain number of voluntary migrants 
to its territory. It has no duty to do so, but nevertheless, it chooses to. It decides the 
terms of admission and publicises them. Voluntary migrants can then decide whether 
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or not to accept those terms. If they choose to immigrate, they can be taken to signal 
their consent. Having consented, they cannot complain later of being treated unjustly.  
 The consent model for just terms of admission should not be misunderstood. It 
is not a model for identifying the best immigration policies. A policy can be just 
without being the best policy. Perhaps a policy of permanent alienage is, in fact, 
inadvisable: benefiting no one, while creating social disharmony. Below, I will 
question this view, noting some of the ways that citizens and migrants can benefit 
from permanent alienage. All I want to stress here, however, is that even if the policy 
were unwise, this would not, in itself, make it unjust. Justice represents a set of core 
moral requirements. States can satisfy these requirements and still make bad 
decisions.  
 There are various considerations that support the consent model for just terms 
of admission. For instance, it is notable that, in a variety of contexts, consent is 
thought sufficient to prevent injustice. It is consent that makes the difference between 
theft and donation; rape and consensual sex; negligence and the voluntary assumption 
of risk. Law courts frequently invoke the principle Volenti Non Fit Injuria: to a 
willing person, no harm is done.  
 The idea that migrants can consent to fewer rights is also familiar. In 
Multicultural Citizenship, Will Kymlicka argues that while people ordinarily have a 
right to live within their “societal culture”, voluntary migrants do not. Their choice to 
migrate can be understood as a choice to waive this right.26 But if voluntary migrants 
can waive their right to live in their societal culture, it seems no less plausible that 
they can waive rights included in the citizenship bundle. 
                                                 
26 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 96. 
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 Next, note that the idea that states are permitted to exclude foreigners from 
citizenship forms a natural corollary to the idea that states are permitted to exclude 
foreigners from their territory. If states are free to decide whether or not migrants are 
admitted, why should they not also decide the terms of their admission? Indeed some 
of the main arguments for the permissibility of immigration restrictions also support 
the permissibility of permanent alienage as well. 
 Consider the argument that freedom of association permits citizens to exclude 
foreigners much like domestic associations, such as golf clubs, are permitted to 
exclude applicants.27 Golf clubs, let us note, can do more than exclude applicants, 
they can also set the terms of admission such that new members are permanently 
denied the rights that current members enjoy. No one should be forced to join a two-
tier golf club, but those who choose to join knowing the terms are not wronged. 
 Next, consider the argument that states own their territory in something like 
the way that people own their property.28 While it is true that property owners have 
broad rights to exclude people from their property, they also have broad rights to set 
the terms of admission. If you invite me to live in your house, you can set the house 
rules. Even if I end up staying indefinitely, I do not thereby acquire the rights of a co-
owner.  
 Finally, consider an economic argument for immigration restrictions. 
Unrestricted migration, it is contended, would overload welfare programmes and 
expose domestic workers to fierce competition.29 These considerations are advanced 
                                                 
27 Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association'. 
28 Ibid., 135, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy--the God that Failed: The Economics and Politics of 
Monarchy, Democracy and Natural Order (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 
148-149. 
29 Matthew J. Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to 
Refugees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp71-75, p83, John Isbister, 'A Liberal 
Argument for Border Controls: Reply to Carens', International Migration Review 34 (2000), 629-635 
at p. 363. 
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as reasons for awarding states the right to restrict immigration, but they could equally 
be advanced as reasons to deny voluntary migrants citizenship. Rights to certain 
welfare programmes and access to certain jobs could then be placed within the 
citizenship bundle, secured for citizens against newcomers.  
 In referring to these arguments, I do not mean to endorse them. There are 
important disanalogies between states, clubs and property owners that render 
arguments from freedom or association and ownership unsound.30 Similarly, the 
economic argument rests on questionable empirical assumptions and indefensible 
normative claims.31 My opposition to these arguments will become clearer below. My 
point here is merely that were we to accept these arguments, we would find the idea 
of permanent alienage hard to resist.  
 
7. Legitimate Paternalism 
 Carens response to the consent argument is to note that, “every plausible 
moral view sets some limits to consent”.32 He is right. Some rights are inalienable and 
governments do enact just laws against certain forms of consensual behaviour. 
Enslavement is neither legal nor moral even when the victim consents. Health and 
safety legislation that prevents us from voluntarily dining at unsanitary restaurants 
seem justified, as do seatbelt laws. Many would also cite laws prohibiting drugs, 
prostitution and organ sales. The list is limited however. Ordinarily we should be 
allowed to do what we consent to do. A government that makes paternalistic law the 
rule rather than the exception is overbearing.  
                                                 
30 Sarah Fine, 'Freedom of Association is Not the Answer', Ethics 120 (2010), 338-356, Phillip Cole, 
Philosophies of Exclusion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 70-73. 
31 Arash Abizadeh, Manish Pandey, and Sohrab Abizadeh, 'Wage Competition and the Special-
Obligations Challenge to More Open Borders', Politics, Philosophy & Economics (2014), Kieran 
Oberman, 'Poverty and Immigration Policy', American Political Science Review 109 (2015), 239-251 at 
p. 255.  
32 Carens, 'Citizenship and Civil Society', p. 115. 
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 How can we determine whether certain conduct falls within or beyond the 
limits to consent? There are various factors to consider. The most important, perhaps, 
is the level of harm that may result. When the costs are minor, consent would seem to 
offer an adequate defence. After all, people routinely engage in permissible 
consensual activities that involve bearing minor costs. It is when costs are severe that 
we doubt whether consent is sufficient.  
 A second consideration is whether people have good reason to consent to the 
conduct in question. People do not seem to have good reason to suffer enslavement, 
drug addiction or the risk of food poisoning. We may suspect that anyone who 
chooses these options does so due to ignorance, manipulation or some other factor 
that leaves them ill placed to engage in rational deliberation. When this is so, 
arguments from consent seem less persuasive. 
 Is permanent alienage beyond the limits to consent? We can certainly imagine 
cases in which the treatment of permanent aliens is impermissible. Permanent aliens 
should not be subjected to violence, slavery, quasi-slavery, starvation or desperate 
poverty whether or not they consent. The European guest worker programmes of the 
1970s (which became permanent alienage programmes since visas were routinely 
renewed) might also have been beyond the limits to consent given the severity of the 
harms involved. Yet as we saw above, permanent alienage need not involve any such 
harm. All permanent alienage necessarily involves is the denial of the title “citizen” 
and at least some of the rights of citizenship. Permanent aliens can live in safety, 
comfort and security, protected by a many of the rights that citizens enjoy.  
 Thus in relation to the first consideration – the level of harm – we find no 
reason to think that permanent alienage always lies beyond the bounds to consent. Let 
us turn to the second consideration: whether people have good reason to consent. 
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Could migrants have good reason to consent to terms of admission under which they 
are permanently excluded from citizenship? Absolutely. There are other things in life 
besides citizenship rights. Migration can allow people to better advance their careers, 
pursue romantic relationships, be close to friends or enjoy new surroundings. By 
migrating to a state in which they will become a permanent alien, voluntary migrants 
indicate that the goods that come with migration are more important to them than the 
good of living in a country in which they enjoy citizenship. It is not irrational to make 
this trade-off. The opportunity to migrate could leave migrants happier, richer and 
healthier.  
 Of course matters might be different if migrants had a recognised right to 
migrate. If the choice migrants faced were between migrating with the promise of 
citizenship or migrating without it, then it would seem doubtful that they could have 
good reason to make the latter choice. But we continue to work under the assumption 
that states are entitled to enforce immigration restrictions. When exclusion is the 
alternative to permanent alienage, permanent alienage can be in a migrant’s best 
interests. The choice to become a permanent alien is thus nothing like the choice to 
become a slave, drug addict or unsanitary restaurant diner. Our second consideration, 
like our first, suggests that permanent alienage can lie within the bounds to consent. 
 
8. A Human Right to Immigrate 
 Permanent alienage, in itself, does not overreach the limits that any plausible 
moral theory would place upon consent. What then could be wrong with the consent 
argument for permanent alienage? We have seen that the consent argument rests on 
the traditional assumption that people have no right to immigrate to other states. In 
this section, I wish to question that assumption. I will argue that the idea of a human 
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right to immigrate follows naturally from an appreciation of already recognised rights 
to basic liberties. I can only sketch that argument here. I cannot develop it or address 
every objection. My aim is not to offer an indisputable argument for a right to 
immigrate, but to show that the idea is plausible and can help to explain what is 
wrong about permanent alienage.33 
 International law recognises rights to freedom of movement, religion, 
association, expression, occupational choice and marriage.34 These rights entitle 
people to access the full range of options available within a country. The right to 
freedom of association, for instance, entitles people to associate with others who are 
willing to associate with them. The right to freedom of religion entitles people to join 
any religion that will have them as a member. A government restricted choice of 
options, however large, is not sufficient to satisfy these rights. The state cannot justify 
banning me from associating with a friend or practising a religion on the basis that 
there are other friends that I could associate with and other religions I could practise. 
Nor can it ban me from entering one area of a country on the basis that there are a 
significant number of options available in my own area of the country. 
 These rights are not only held by citizens. As is clearly stated in international 
law, foreigners too are entitled to freedom of movement, religion, association, 
expression and marriage while they are legally resident within a state.35 There is a 
good reason for this. Foreigners, as much as citizens, have an interest in the freedom 
to make basic decisions about their lives free from government interference. 
Foreigners, as much as citizens, should be able to decide where they live, whom they 
                                                 
33 I have defended the idea at length elsewhere. See Kieran Oberman, 'Immigration as a Human Right', 
in Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, ed. Sarah Fine and Lea 
Ypi, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
34 See, for instance, articles 13, 17, 18, 19, 23 and 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.. 
35 Human Rights Committee, 'General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant', 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (1986), para. 2. The one exception is freedom of occupational choice that is 
ordinarily and, in my view, mistakenly, conceived of as a right that only citizens possess. 
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live with, which associations they join, with whom they communicate, which (if any) 
religions they practise, which job they take and whom they marry, without the 
government placing restrictions on the options available to them.  
 Yet if foreigners and citizens are entitled to make these basic decisions as they 
please, then the justifiability of immigration restrictions are immediately called into 
question. For immigration restrictions constitute government restrictions on the range 
of options available to people. Anyone who is prevented from entering a country is 
prevented from accessing the options available within its territory: she cannot live 
within the country or associate freely with people living there; she cannot join civic 
associations or religious congregations, take a job, give talks or attend conferences 
with the country’s territory; nor can she marry and settle down with one of its citizens, 
unless her partner can migrate instead. Immigration restrictions, in other words, 
infringe the exercise of all other rights to basic liberties. If these rights protect the 
freedom of everyone, foreigners included, to make basic decisions regarding their 
lives, then it seems plausible to believe that everyone must have a right to cross 
international borders.  
 
9. Immigration and Citizenship 
 Were we to accept this idea of a human right to immigrate, what implications 
would it have for permanent alienage? It might be thought that the human right to 
immigrate is compatible with permanent alienage. After all, on a straightforward 
understanding of what it means to violate a right, a right is violated when the right 
holder is prevented from accessing the object of their right. Permanent aliens are not 
prevented from immigrating and so permanent alienage does not violate a human right 
to immigrate. However, we need to distinguish between the implications of the right 
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to immigrate itself and the implications of the right when conjoined with the equal 
treatment argument. Even if the right itself does not provide an objection to 
permanent alienage, it does do so once combined with the equal treatment argument.  
 Let us then recall the equal treatment argument presented in section 5. The 
argument holds that foreign and native residents should be treated alike unless there is 
a relevant moral difference that can justify differential treatment. If natives are 
granted citizenship and there is no relevant moral difference between native and 
foreign residents, then the latter should also be granted citizenship. We found, 
however, that, in the case of voluntary migrants, there could be a relevant moral 
difference. If voluntary migrants have no right to immigrate, they could be taken to 
signal consent to the denial of citizenship.  
 The importance of the idea of the right to immigrate then is that it rescues the 
equal treatment argument from the consent objection. If a voluntary migrant has a 
right to immigrate, then one cannot infer a migrant’s consent to the terms of her 
admission from the fact that she has chosen to migrate. Consent cannot be inferred 
from any action a person chooses to perform. Consent can only be inferred from a 
person’s action when it is reasonable to expect the person to forego performing that 
action in order to signal their dissent. If a person has a right to immigrate, they cannot 
be reasonably expected to forego exercising it in order to signal their dissent to the 
terms of their admission. 
 To see this, it is helpful to consider a parallel case involving other human 
rights to basic liberties. Imagine the government sought to deny a certain public 
benefit to people based on how they chose to exercise their human right to freedom of 
religion, expression or marital choice. Suppose, for instance, it sought to deny free 
dental care provided to other residents to those who worship certain religions, attend 
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certain public meetings or marry people from a particular geographical area. If it 
advertised its policy in advance, could it infer consent to the denial of free dental care 
from those who chose these options? It seems clear that it could not. People have 
strong interests in the freedom to choose amongst the available options when deciding 
such matters as which religion they practise, how they express themselves and whom 
they marry. These interests are so strong, in fact, that they are protected by human 
rights. Because people have these strong interests, it is unreasonable to expect them to 
forego certain options in order to avoid consenting to unequal treatment. The effect of 
this is that someone’s decision about whether or not to worship a particular religion, 
attend a public meeting or marry a certain person must be assumed to be a decision 
about that religion, meeting or person, not a decision about whether to reject free 
dental care or any other unrelated matter. A government that acted in the manner 
described would be guilty of arbitrary discrimination and it could not appeal to 
notions of consent to deflect that charge. 
 Exactly the same is true in the immigration case. The argument for the right to 
immigrate is based upon people’s interests in being able to make free choices about 
such basic matters as where they live, whom they live with, which associations they 
join, with whom they communicate, which (if any) religions they practise, which job 
they take and whom they marry. A decision to immigrate must be assumed to be a 
choice about such matters, not about consent to permanent alienage. To expect 
someone to forgo certain options (a relationship, a career, an invitation to join a 
religious community etc.) in order to signal their dissent is unreasonable given the 
strong interests at stake.  
 This not to deny that there are occasions in which people can consent to 
something by means of exercising a basic liberty. People can clearly consent to being 
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married, for instance, by exercising their freedom of marital choice. But these are 
occasions in which the ability to consent to something forms part of the basic liberty 
itself. If people could not consent to being married, people could not enjoy freedom of 
marital choice. The ability to consent to the denial of free dental care, by contrast, 
forms no part of freedom of religion, expression or marital choice. Likewise, the 
ability to consent to permanent alienage forms no part of the freedom to immigrate. 
 Note that while the argument I have advanced here condemns the imposition 
of discriminatory costs upon people exercising a basic liberty, it does not (absurdly) 
condemn the imposition of costs of any kind. In fact, it leaves space for two kinds of 
cost. First, there are the costs that are imposed uniformly on everyone, whether or not 
they exercise a basic liberty. If immigrants are forced to abide by the laws and taxes 
that are imposed upon natives, for instance, they cannot complain of unequal 
treatment. It is true that they did not consent to those laws and taxes, but nor did the 
natives. Second, even targeted costs can be justified as long as there is a morally 
relevant factor that can justify differential treatment. We found in section 3 that 
settlement does seem to be a relevant factor when it comes to naturalization. Tourists 
and other short-term visitors do not seem entitled to citizenship. Residency 
requirements may thus be permissible. It is in the case of long-term residents, that we 
struggle to find any factor that can justify awarding them a different status to the 
native population. 
 What I am arguing for then, in relation to international migrants, is actually 
something similar to what internal migrants in the EU, US and Canada currently 
enjoy. EU, US and Canadian citizens who internally relocate to a new state or 
province do not instantaneously acquire all the rights that insiders possess. 
Nevertheless, in all three jurisdictions, people are entitled to move and do acquire 
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equal rights after a period of residency.36 A world in which the human right to 
immigrate was recognised would be similar to this. It would be a world in which there 
are still insiders and outsiders, but one in which outsiders are permanently excluded 
from neither territory nor citizenship.37 
  
10. Conclusion 
 The question “what is wrong with permanent alienage?” is surprisingly 
difficult to answer. Permanent alienage is not wrong because permanent aliens are 
disenfranchised, posses social ties, suffer oppression or free ride upon the efforts of 
citizens. None of these things need be the case. The matter is further complicated by 
the fact that many migrants voluntarily choose to immigrate. On the traditional view, 
people have no right to immigrate. If we assume this traditional view, then the choice 
voluntary migrants make to immigrate would seem to signal consent to the terms of 
their admission. 
 The correct answer to the question “what is wrong with permanent alienage?” 
depends then on the idea of a human right to immigrate. Because voluntary migrants 
have a human right to immigrate, they cannot be thought to signal consent to the 
terms of their admission. Since voluntary migrants cannot be said to consent, consent 
cannot be said to represent a relevant difference between foreign long-term residents 
and natives. If there is no relevant difference between the two and natives are awarded 
citizenship, foreign long-term residents should also be awarded citizenship. 
                                                 
36 Willem Maas, 'Free Movement and Discrimination: Evidence from Europe, the United States, and 
Canada', European Journal of Migration and Law 15 (2013), 91-110. 
37 What about other naturalization requirements such as citizenship tests or the requirement that 
migrants renounce prior citizenship? Here to, the principle of equal treatment offers some guidance. 
For such requirements to be justified, it must be shown that they do not amount to arbitrary 
discrimination. If natives are allowed to be ignorant of their country’s politics, history and culture, 
foreign long-term residents should not be required to be knowledgeable. If natives are permitted dual 
citizenship, long-term residents should likewise. Naturalization requirements are not then necessarily 
unjust but they would be unjust if they subjected long-term residents to inequitable burdens. 
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 A consequence of this conclusion is that we must reject the consensus that has 
grown up around the issue of naturalization. Naturalization cannot be decoupled from 
immigration. Those who defend immigration restrictions should endorse permanent 
alienage for if the former can be defended, so can the latter. Those of us who, on the 
other hand, condemn permanent alienage have further reason to question what should 
be questioned in any case: the justifiability of imposing immigration restrictions that 
curtail people’s freedom to make basic decisions about their lives such as where they 
live, which job they take and whom they marry. 
 
 
